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Governance through publicity: anti-social behaviour orders, young 
people and the problematization of the right to anonymity 
Neil Cobb• 
 
Since the early 20th century, young people under eighteen involved in legal proceedings 
have been granted a degree of protection from the glare of media publicity. One 
controversial consequence of recent reforms of the anti-social behaviour order (ASBO), 
however, is the incremental reduction in the anonymity rights available to those subject 
to the mechanism, together with calls by the Home Office for details of such individuals 
to be publicised as a matter of course. Numerous commentators have criticised the 
Government accordingly for reinstating the Draconian practice of ‘naming and 
shaming’. This paper contends that these developments can be usefully analysed 
through the lens of Foucault’s work on state governance. It explores, in particular, how 
challenges to the right reflect both the fall of anonymity and the rise of publicity in the 
governance of what I term ‘ASBO subjects’, together with the communities in which 
they live, under ‘advanced liberal’ rule. 
 
Keywords: governmentality; anti-social behaviour; ASBO; children and young people; 
anonymity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In his later writing, Michel Foucault examines the various and complex ways in which 
power is exercised in society. Political rationalities, as Foucault explains, are ways of 
rendering reality knowable for the purpose of governance. Contemporary state 
governance, he suggests, consists of a triangle of such rationalities; sovereignty, 
discipline and government,1 which together he terms ‘governmentality’. Early 
sovereign technologies entailed the use of repressive force by the state, in an effort to 
establish and maintain effective control over geographical territory, exemplified by the 
spectacle of the public execution. Of greater interest to Foucault, however, are the 
complex modern forms of governance, exacted through a combination of disciplinary 
and governmental technologies, operating not simply repressively but productively, 
designed to strengthen the state by improving the very soul of the subject. Discipline, on 
the one hand, entails the production of docile and co-operative individuals (through 
processes of surveillance, classification and normalization) and populations (through 
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1 M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller, The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
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processes of bio-power). Government, on the other, reflects more recent attempts by the 
state to exercise power ‘from a distance’ by encouraging individuals to engage 
independently in their own self-governance, and the governance of others, in line with 
its ow
 ethically to secure the 
well-b
hemselves and act upon themselves to make themselves 
 target and process, increasingly implicated in the state’s governmental 
strategi
                                                
n objectives.  
An Anglo-Saxon Neo-Foucauldian school has developed the concept of 
governmentality, applying it to the operation of power within the modern liberal 
democratic state. Nikolas Rose, in particular, maps the genealogy of contemporary 
Western liberal democracies using three political rationalities: classical, social and 
advanced liberalism.2 Rose equates advanced liberal rule with the role of neo-liberalism 
in the ‘death of the social’, deploying the concept of government to explain the 
harnessing (or ‘responsibilization’3) of a variety of statutory, voluntary and commercial 
actors and organisations in place of the centralised disciplinary techniques of state 
welfare. He explores, in particular, the rise of what he terms ‘ethopolitics’, by which 
individuals are encouraged to continually work on themselves
eing of themselves and their dependents. As he explains: 
If discipline individualizes and normalizes, and biopower collectivizes and 
socializes, ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques by which human 
beings should judge t
better than they are.4  
Of particular importance for Rose, as we shall see, is the role of ‘community’ as both 
ethopolitical
es.5 
Neo-Foucauldian theorists continue to explore the apparent rise of advanced 
liberal forms of governance within the specific field of crime control,6 including recent 
analysis of youth justice policy under New Labour.7 Similarly, I want to examine the 
 
2 N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (1999). 
3 D. Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001), pp. 124-
7. 
4 N. Rose, ‘Community, citizenship and the Third Way’ in D. Meredyth and G. Minson (eds.) Citizenship 
and Cultural Policy (2001), p. 18. 
5 N. Rose, ‘The death of the social? Refiguring the territory of government’ (1996) 25(3) Economy and 
Society 327 at 331-7. 
6 K. Stenson and A. Edwards, ‘Rethinking crime control in advanced liberal government’, in K. Stenson 
and R. R. Sullivan (eds.) Crime, Risk and Justice (2001); K. Stenson, ‘Crime control, social policy and 
liberalism’ in G. Lewis, S. Gewirtz and J. Clarke (eds.) Rethinking Social Policy (2000); N. Rose, 
‘Government and control’ (2000) 40 Brit J of Crim 321; D. Garland, ‘Governmentality and the problem 
of crime: Foucault, criminology, sociology’ (1997) 1(2) Theoretical Criminology 173. 
7 B. Vaughan, ‘The governance of youth: disorder and dependence?’ (2000) 9(3) Social and Legal Studies 
347; R. Smith, ‘Foucault’s law: the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (2000) 1(2) Youth Justice 17; J. 
Muncie and G. Hughes, ‘Modes of youth governance: political rationalities, criminalization and 
resistance’ in J. Muncie, G. Hughes and E. McLaughlin, Youth Justice: Critical Readings (2002). 
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various ways in which advanced liberal rule seeks to govern through both agents of 
crime control and young offenders themselves within the particular (constructed) field 
of ‘anti-social behaviour’.8 At the heart of government initiatives in this area is the anti-
social behaviour order (ASBO); a civil order directed towards the prevention of future 
anti-social behaviour through the deterrent effect of criminal sanction on breach.9 
Recently, the Government has challenged the right to anonymity of those 
(predominantly young) people targeted by the ASBO; what I term ‘ASBO subjects’, by 
encouraging greater use of publicity by local agencies while simultaneously reducing 
the legal rights protecting children from publicity under the 1933 Children and Young 
Persons Act (‘the 1933 Act’). In this paper, I suggest that the rise of the ‘naming and 
shaming’ of the ASBO subject can be usefully explained in terms of the complex and 
contra
governance’.12 Second, a diachronic model of advanced liberal governance highlights 
                                                
dictory governmental mentalities and technologies of the advanced liberal state.  
In so doing, I acknowledge from the outset criticisms that the tendency to equate 
advanced liberal forms of rule with the governmental techniques of neo-liberalism 
provides only a cursory analysis of contemporary crime control in England and 
Wales.10 I return instead to Foucault’s sovereignty-discipline-governmentality triangle, 
recognising, as Stenson does, the synchronic rather than diachronic interrelationship 
between these three rationalities.11 This aspect of Foucault’s work has two important 
implications for a theory of contemporary governance.  First, rather than positioning 
advanced liberalism as diametrically opposed to the social, it explains the continuance 
of social forms of governance within the advanced liberal state. Thus, while Rose might 
talk of the death of the social, I prefer what Pavlich terms the rise of ‘co-social 
 
8 For a general introduction to the Government’s ‘Respect’ agenda, see E. Burney, Making People 
Behave: Anti-social behaviour, Politics and Policy (2005). For a recent governmental analysis see J. Flint 
and J. Nixon, ‘Governing neighbours: anti-social behaviour orders and new forms of regulating conduct 
in the UK’ (2006) 43(5/6) Urban Studies 939. 
9 Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) 1998, s. 1. The ASBO has received almost universal criticism from 
academic commentators. Criticisms focus upon both the legal and criminological implications of the 
order. Criminological assessments note the high breach rate, bringing many young people prematurely 
within the criminal justice system, together with the failure to tackle the underlying causes of anti-social 
behaviour: E. Burney, ‘Talking tough, acting coy: what happened to the anti-social behaviour order?’ 
(2002) 41(5) The Howard Journal 469; P. Squires with D. Stephen, ‘Rethinking ASBOs’ (2005) 25(4) 
Critical Social Policy 517. Legal criticisms highlight the hybrid nature of the order, allowing an 
individual to be brought within the ambit of the criminal law without the benefit of the procedural legal 
protections granted to criminal defendants, and the breadth and vagueness of the definition of anti-social 
behaviour: Ashworth et al, ‘Neighbouring on the oppressive: the Government’s “anti-social behaviour 
order” proposals’ (1998) 16(1) Criminal Justice 7. 
10 D. Cowan and D. Lomax, ‘Policing unauthorised camping’ (2003) 30(2) JLS 283 at 287-9. 
11 K. Stenson ‘Crime control, governmentality and sovereignty’ in R. Smandych (ed.) Governable Places: 
Readings on Governmentality and Crime Control (1999), p. 54. 
12 G. Pavlich ‘Transforming images: society, law and critique’ in G. Wickham and G. Pavlich, Rethinking 
Law, Society and Governance: Foucault’s Bequest (2001), p. 4. 
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the continued relevance of sovereign rationalities and technologies of crime control 
operating alongside the more subtle disciplinary-governmental complexes.  
Concentrating for a moment upon the latter consideration, I find convincing 
Stenson’s argument that contemporary sovereign rule should not be dismissed as merely 
atavistic, archaic and irrational. In fact, as Stenson contends, ‘use of force, symbolic 
representations of force and juridical authority … is a sophisticated feature of current 
social reality.’13 There is evidence, first, of the continued relevance, as a consequence of 
the neo-conservative discourses underpinning Government policy, of coercive 
technologies to control those troublesome groups unwilling or unable to engage in 
regulated freedom.14 Second, Stenson in particular argues that advanced liberal crime 
control increasingly deploys forms of rule designed to resist challenges to the state’s 
sovereignty over various political and geographical territories.15 
The paper deliberately adopts the methodology of ‘discursive governmentality’,16 
which relies upon textual analysis for its understanding of the rationalities and 
technologies of advanced liberal governance. On the one hand, it examines the political 
discourses behind youth anonymity in England and Wales as expressed by New Labour. 
Accordingly, it employs Government policy documents, ministerial statements and 
formal guidance on the use of publicity to support its claims about the changing central 
government rationalities underpinning the control of youth crime and their impact upon 
governance through anonymity. However, recognising that the operation of the right to 
anonymity is regulated by law as well as politics, the paper also explores the legal 
infrastructure behind the right to anonymity, and its role in providing ‘authorization’17 
for these governmental techniques or, as Tadros puts it, its importance as ‘an interface 
through which governmental decisions can take effect by adjusting the operations and 
arrangements of the disciplinary mechanisms’.18 Thus, the paper engages in a 
genealogy of the right to anonymity, following its inception in the 1933 Act, through 
legislative reform and judicial precedents on its appropriate implementation, together 
with the treatment under the Human Rights Act of ASBO publicity released by public 
authorities.  
                                                 
13 Stenson, op. cit. n. 11, p. 63. 
14 M. Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (1999), Ch. 9. 
15 K. Stenson, ‘Reconstructing the government of crime’ in Wickham and Pavlich, op. cit. n. 12, pp. 105-
8. 
16 K. Stenson, ‘Sovereignty, biopolitics and the local government of crime in Britain’ (2005) 9(3) 
Theoretical Criminology 265. 
17 N. Rose and M. Valverde, ‘Governed by law?’ (1998) 7(4) Social and Legal Studies 541 at 550. 
18 V. Tadros, ‘Between governance and discipline: the law and Michel Foucault’ (1998) 18(1) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 75 at 79.  
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It is, of course, important to recognise from the outset the limitations inherent in 
the methodology of discursive governmentality. Concentrating in this way upon the 
rationalities operating at the highest level of governance; the political and 
jurisprudential discourses of national government and the higher courts, my analysis 
inevitably fails to consider effectively the complex ways in which technologies of 
governance are implemented at the level of the local. Foucault has often been criticised 
for failing to recognise the possibility of resistance in his work on discipline.19  This 
paper, on the other hand, explores the potential for reinterpretation of advanced liberal 
rationalities, and modification of the operation of technologies such as the ASBO, by 
both local agencies of social control (for instance, the local executive agency, or the trial 
judge deciding on the merits of their applications for an order) and the ASBO subject 
him or herself.  
The paper therefore accepts that, to meaningfully appreciate the potential for 
resistance to the rationalities and technologies of governance operating around the 
ASBO subject, further analysis in this field must move towards what Stenson terms 
‘realist governmentality’, which ‘[supplements] discourse analysis of mentalities with 
grounded, empirical, realist analysis of governing practices, and [draws] on both bodies 
of theory and research,’20 in order to better understand the practical distribution of 
power around the ASBO subject. Nevertheless, as an initial attempt to unravel the 
complex (and seemingly contradictory) mentalities in this area of law, and given the 
inevitable limitations of space, my discursive focus upon ‘high’ politics and law 
provides, in my opinion, a useful starting-point for further socio-legal analysis in this 
area. Moreover, every effort has been made to ensure that empirical research is used, 
where available, to shed light upon the realities of local implementation. 
 
1. A GENEALOGY OF YOUTH ANONYMITY 
 
Discourses of mainstream criminal justice, drawing upon the classical construction of 
the rational, free-willed subject, tend to emphasise the importance of accountability, and 
punishment, of individuals for wrongdoing. However, state governance of low-level 
youth disorder has been affected to a greater degree by the tenets of what criminologists 
term welfarism.21 In fact, it is possible to identify two strands of welfarism that have 
                                                 
19 L. McNay, Foucault: A Critical Introduction (1994), pp. 100-104. 
20 Stenson, op. cit. n. 16, p. 266. 
21 H. Hendrick, ‘Histories of youth crime and justice’ in B. Goldson and J. Muncie, Youth Crime and 
Justice (2006).  
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developed around troublesome young people, best explained using Garland’s distinction 
between criminologies of ‘everyday life’ and ‘the other’.22 On either interpretation 
disorderly youths are reconstructed as non-responsible for their conduct, but for 
markedly different reasons.  
Welfarist criminologies of everyday life treat low-level youth disorder as merely 
symptomatic of the natural processes of child development: 
For the majority of ‘offending’ children and young people, their anti-social 
behaviour [is] essentially petty and opportunistic and little more than a transitory 
phase that they [will] grow out of.23 
The assumption, then, is that the ‘anti-social’ youth is always already capable of 
exercising responsible freedom naturally over time without intervention by the state. 
Alternatively, welfarist criminologies of the ‘other’ treat disorderly behaviour by young 
people as the product of individual or social pathology. Consequently, discourses of 
vulnerability temper (though never fully replace) those of blame, and legislative 
measures are often enacted to facilitate effective support for young offenders’ needs. As 
Parton explains: 
A major assumption of welfarism is that, apart for a very small number, because 
the depraved are essentially deprived or misguided, everyone is treatable or can 
be rehabilitated.24  
Over much of the last century, youth justice in England and Wales was 
compartmentalised and reconfigured under a welfarist criminology of the other as a 
gateway to the burgeoning welfare state, with young offenders subject to the growing 
expertise of its agencies and professionals. These developments, of course, reached their 
high-water mark during the 1960s with the enactment of the 1969 Children and Young 
Persons Act, designed to remove young offenders wholly from the criminal justice 
system and into the hands of the social work profession.25  
It is often assumed that the rise of welfarism reflects the compassionate and 
humanitarian zeal of early 20th century reformers, ‘child savers’, dedicated altruistically 
to the protection of young people. An alternative perspective, however, is propounded 
by revisionist theorists, such as Foucault, who conversely explain the rise of the 
expertise and practices of welfarism as a mechanism of control. In particular, they argue 
                                                 
22 Garland, op. cit. n. 3, p. 137. 
23 B. Goldson, ‘Children in trouble: state responses to juvenile crime’ in P. Scraton, “Childhood in 
Crisis”? (1997), p. 124. 
24 N. Parton, ‘“Problematics of government”, (post) modernity and social work’ (1994) 24 Br J Social Wk 
9 at 22. 
25 A. Bottoms ‘On the decriminalisation of English juvenile courts’ in J. Muncie et al, op. cit. n. 7. 
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that the intervention of social workers into the lives of young offenders is a disciplinary 
system, organised around the medium of the social, and aimed at the alignment of the 
behaviour of targeted individuals with the governmental objectives of the state. As 
Stenson explains:  
It is possible to see the role of social work in trying to extend the practical and 
inner capacities of citizenship, as part of a wider spread of governmental power, 
based on surveillance and moving beyond the institutional sites of the prison, 
school and so on into the wider society.26  
Rather than mere altruism, social work developed around the young offender to prevent 
the loss of otherwise valuable human resource to criminality; what Donzelot describes 
as ‘the squandering of vital forces, the unused or useless individuals’.27 Accordingly, a 
‘tutelary complex’ grew up in an effort to overcome the social and individual 
pathologies of both young offenders and their families.28  
The principle of youth anonymity in England and Wales arose as part of a host of 
early 20th century welfarist reforms. Given legal weight, first, by the 1908 Children Act, 
then the consolidating 1933 Act and more recently the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 (‘the 1999 Act’), it provides protection from media scrutiny to 
young people under eighteen involved in both civil and criminal legal proceedings. It 
has received scant attention from commentators, however; apparently accepted without 
question as a necessary component of child welfare. Nevertheless, as with other 
components of welfarist youth justice policy, the principle might be analysed 
straightforwardly as another example of the altruism of early welfarist legislators. One 
might suppose it was designed to shield young people from the harm that they would 
otherwise suffer from association with particular legal proceedings. Historically, young 
offenders received the strongest legal protections given, one might assume, the 
particularly strong social stigma that accompanies publicity of criminal proceedings, 
and the consequent possibility of physical harm through vigilantism or the 
psychological damage caused by social exclusion. Moreover, unlike adult offenders, in 
relation to whom ‘the unspoken premise seems to be that being named in the newspaper 
is a part of the sanction,’29 the perceived moral non-responsibility of children would 
have rendered problematic the justice of publicity as punishment.  
                                                 
26 K. Stenson, ‘Social work discourse and the social work interview’ (1993) 22(1) Economy and Society 
42 at 50.   
27 J. Donzelot, The Policing of Families (1979), p. 25. 
28 Id. 
29 J. R. Spencer, ‘Naming and shaming young offenders’ (2000) 59(3) Cambridge LJ 466 at 466. 
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It is contended, however, following the revisionists, that the right to anonymity is 
explainable not simply as an act of legislative altruism, but simultaneously as a 
technology of social control: the principle must be reconsidered as an ethopolitical 
strategy. Specifically, I would argue, it was the ‘discovery’ of the impact of ‘labelling’ 
upon young people by positive criminologists in the post-war period that provided 
ideological support for its role in their governance.30  
Advocates of labelling theory argue that formal or informal classifications of 
young people as deviant encourages those individuals to actively reject moral norms 
and descend into more serious criminality. In governmental terms, at the heart of this 
‘ethopolitics of labelling’ are both welfarist criminologies of everyday life and the 
other. Troublesome youth are either judged naturally equipped to engage eventually in 
responsible freedom, or else ‘pathological’ but reformable through the disciplinary 
processes of social work. In either case, their inevitable progress to effective self-
governance is threatened by the process of negative classification. In its hey-day during 
the 1960s and 1970s, the ethopolitics of labelling had a considerable impact upon the 
governance of low-level youth disorder in England and Wales, contributing to the 
welfarist rationality (displaced, as we will see, by New Labour’s Respect agenda) that 
formal intervention by the criminal justice system to control troublesome conduct 
should be avoided wherever possible.31 The right to anonymity was a key component of 
this governmental strategy, designed to shield the subject from the particular stigma of 
community disapproval which might otherwise reinforce the subject’s self-conception 
as deviant. 
Nevertheless, the principle of youth anonymity has been confronted since its 
inception by competing discourses promoting the value of publicity of legal 
proceedings. Historically, the predominant challenge has been that posed by classical, 
rather than advanced liberal, rule and its abstract, constitutional concern with the 
defence of individual freedom against state tyranny. Importance tends to be placed, 
particularly, upon the principle of open justice. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill has 
written in curia, ‘it is a hallowed principle that justice is administered in public, open to 
full and fair reporting of court proceedings so that the public may be informed about the 
justice administered in their name’.32 That a balance was struck, from the outset, 
                                                 
30 E. Lemert, Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic Behaviour (1951); 
H. S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (1963).  
31 Labelling theory within the academy, and consequent calls for a retraction of formal intervention in 
youth crime, reached its criminological peak in the 1970s with the publication of Schur’s Radical Non-
Intervention (1973). 
32 McKerry v Teesdale and Wear Valley Justices [2001] EMLR 5 at 3. 
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between classical and welfarist rationalities in law explains why youth anonymity has 
been seldom afforded as an unconditional right. In civil trials and criminal trials not 
before the Youth Court, for example, there has always been a presumption in favour of 
publicity (now regulated by section 39 of the 1933 Act and section 45 of the 1999 Act 
respectively). Before the Youth Court, there was originally an absolute prohibition on 
publicity under the 1933 Act, reflecting the importance placed upon protecting the 
young offender. However, subsection 49(4A), introduced by the 1997 Crime 
(Sentences) Act, now provides courts with the power to overturn that presumption if 
they judge that to do so would be in the public interest.  
It is the particular interface between the right to anonymity and the ASBO that 
concerns us here, of course. Specifically, it is the contention of this paper that recent 
political and legal challenges to the principle provide an interesting example of many of 
the characteristics of advanced liberal crime control identified by the governmentality 
school. First, though, an explanation of the nature of these challenges to the principle is 
required. Since the creation of the ASBO, the right to anonymity, as it applies to the 
ASBO subject, has faced a sustained assault by New Labour. The first evidence of 
Government concerns was political. In 2001, Jack Straw, the then Home Secretary was 
reported as claiming that:  
There may be grounds for imposing reporting restrictions during application 
proceedings concerning a juvenile, but in my view the situation changes if an 
ASBO is made.33  
He then proceeded to suggest that there should, in fact, be a presumption in favour of 
publicity in such circumstances. Subsequently, this position found its way into official 
policy, in the form of Home Office guidance which now explicitly advocates the 
identification of the ASBO subject as part of a post-application media strategy. ASBO 
publicity involving young people, it demands, is to be the norm rather than the 
exception.34  
What began as a political problematization, however, developed quickly into a 
legal one, with criticism levelled eventually at the anonymity rights granted by the 1933 
Act. It soon became clear to the Government that the structure of the legislation 
hindered the pursuit of greater publicity of the ASBO subject. Application for an 
original, or ‘stand alone’ ASBO is sought before the magistrates’ court, and as such 
section 39 applies to these proceedings, creating a presumption in favour of publicity. In 
                                                 
33 P. Humphries, ‘Shame faced’, The Guardian, 24 October 2001. 
34 Home Office, Guidance on Publicising Anti-social Behaviour Orders (2005), p. 2. 
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a number of other ASBO proceedings, however, it was section 49 (which reverses this 
presumption), rather than section 39, that governed the right to anonymity. Section 49 
applied to the ‘CRASBO’ imposed following a criminal conviction,35 together with 
breach proceedings, where those proceedings take place before the Youth Court. The 
Government sought accordingly to reform the law in these areas. The 2003 Anti-social 
Behaviour Act revoked section 49 for the purpose of proceedings for a CRASBO 
brought before the Youth Court, while the 2005 Serious Organised Crime and Police 
Act replaced it in breach proceedings.36 The upshot is that all ASBO proceedings are 
now governed by section 39 of the 1933 Act.  
Both the Government’s political demands for greater use of publicity and the 
legal changes made to the 1933 Act have attracted the strident criticism of 
commentators including Professor Rod Morgan, ex-chairman of the Youth Justice 
Board, Al Aynsley-Green, the Children’s Commissioner and Alvaro Gil-Robles, the 
previous Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe.37 The anger of 
Parliamentarians too is evident in the debates over the anonymity reforms contained in 
both the Anti-social Behaviour and Serious Organised Crime and Police Bills.38 
Notably, Baroness Stern argued, in that context, that the Government had shown itself  
willing, by sleight of hand, to throw in the rubbish bin the perceived wisdom of 
all those who care for the rights of children and who fought for them for nearly 
two centuries.39 
In each case, welfarist discourses (notably, tending to take the form of altruistic rather 
than governmental arguments) continue to pose a political challenge to the dismantling 
of the principle of youth anonymity. 
Importantly, criticism has refocused, particularly, upon the impact of labelling. 
Elizabeth Burney, for instance, has warned that  
[t]he practical arguments in favour of publicising ASBOs notwithstanding, the 
practice is likely to be particularly harmful where young people are involved, as 
well as unwise.  
She continues ‘shame by itself, without any reintegrating process is likely to be counter-
productive, resulting in rejection of the ethical standpoint of the accusers’.40 In line with 
                                                 
35 CDA 1998, s. 1C. 
36 SOCPA, s. 141. 
37 C. Dyer, ‘“Naming and shaming” guidance condemned’, The Guardian, 25 February 2006; M. Berlins 
‘Naming and shaming is a con’, The Guardian, 27 February 2006; A. Gil-Robles, Report by the 
Commissioner for Human Rights on his visit to the United Kingdom, 4th – 12th November 2004, 
CommDH(2005)6.  
38 HL Hansard, 17 Sept 2003, col 1023; HL Hansard, 6 April 2005, cols 772-774. 
39 HL Hansard, 6 April 2005, col 774. 
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the analysis set out above, interestingly Burney’s challenge operates at both an altruistic 
and governmental level. She raises an altruistic concern, on the one hand, that publicity 
may harm the ASBO subject by encouraging his or her social exclusion. On the other, 
however, she warns that publicity will prove not only harmful but ‘unwise’, implying a 
governmental concern that labelling, exacerbated by publicity, impacts negatively upon 
efforts to either safeguard the subject’s natural capacity for ethical self-governance, or 
else undermines his or her effective reconstruction through social work.    
This article explores the rationale behind the Government’s desire for greater 
publicity of the ASBO subject. In doing so, it explains its problematization of youth 
anonymity in terms of the often complex and contradictory rationalities and 
technologies underpinning the governance of ‘anti-social behaviour’ in England and 
Wales. The first part of our genealogy of youth anonymity has shown that challenges to 
the principle stemmed, historically, from an abstract, constitutional demand for open 
justice. Alternatively, I argue below that the current assault against the principle in the 
ASBO context clearly reflects the concerns of advanced liberal forms of rule. I contend 
further that the justifications for ASBO publicity provide a valuable illustration of the 
complex synchronic relationship between sovereign, disciplinary and governmental 
mentalities within advanced liberal governance. There are three parts to the analysis. 
The first part seeks to ascertain the reasons for the fall of anonymity of the ASBO subject 
as a governmental technique, while the second and third parts analyze the simultaneous 
rise of governance of that subject through publicity. 
 
2. NEO-CONSERVATISM AND THE FALL OF YOUTH ANONYMITY  
 
Ultimately, the fall of anonymity of the ASBO subject is best explained as a corollary to 
contemporary challenges to the expertise and practices of welfarism under advanced 
liberal rule.41 Members of the governmentality school tend to argue that the rationalities 
and technologies of advanced liberalism are the product of neo-liberal politics. This 
paper suggests, instead, that the governance of ‘anti-social behaviour’ cannot be 
understood without reference to the role of the residual moralism of neo-conservatism 
                                                                                                                                               
40 Burney, op. cit. n. 8, p. 97. See, also, the use of labelling theory by Rod Morgan (S. Goodchild, 
‘Demonised: We lock them up. We give them ASBOs. But is our fear of kids making them worse?’, The 
Independent, 23 April 2006) and in written responses to the Home Affairs Select Committee (Report into 
Anti-social Behaviour (2005), para. 131).  
41 Exemplified by the claim of Louise Casey, director of the Government’s Anti-social Behaviour Unit, 
that ‘youth workers, social workers and the liberal intelligentsia’ who had attacked the ASBO were ‘not 
living in the real world’: L. Ward, ‘ASBO chief rounds on liberal critics’, The Guardian, 10 June 2005.  
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in the reconstruction of the characteristics of ‘anti-social’ youth.42  Neo-liberal and neo-
conservative discourses are symptomatic of the rise of advanced liberal approaches to 
the governance of crime and anti-social behaviour, and share one important 
characteristic: both encourage the transfer of responsibility for the governance of that 
conduct away from the state. Where the two discourses differ fundamentally, however, 
is the target of their respective responsibilization strategies. While neo-liberalism 
encourages the transfer of policing responsibilities from the state to agencies and 
individuals within the private sphere (a process explored in greater detail below), neo-
conservatism demands that the targets of crime control, including the ASBO subject, 
take greater responsibility for their own troublesome conduct. This construction of the 
offender is particularly evident within the discourses underpinning the Respect agenda. 
While neo-conservatism has been repackaged to reflect the Government’s ostensibly 
communitarian political philosophy,43 there is little difference, to my mind, between the 
two ideologies in terms of their understanding of the ‘anti-social behaviour’ of young 
people. 
Neo-conservatism challenges the knowledge claims of both welfarist 
criminologies of everyday life and the other. Notwithstanding the former’s construction 
of the ‘anti-social’ youth progressing inevitably towards responsible freedom, his neo-
conservative counterpart is treated in no uncertain terms as other. As Squires explains, 
New Labour clearly views anti-social behaviour not as normal adolescent conduct but 
‘the seedbed of delinquency, the beginning of a persistent offending career’.44 However, 
this criminology of the other is unlike its welfarist predecessor. In line with other 
aspects of contemporary social policy, governance of youth anti-social behaviour is 
increasingly (but not wholly) organised around neo-conservatism’s moralistic aetiology 
of criminal conduct.45 Rose notes that under advanced liberal forms of rule:  
The pervasive image of the perpetrator of crime is not one of the juridical subject 
of the rule of law, nor that of the social and psychological subject of criminology, 
but of the individual who has failed to accept his or her responsibilities as a 
subject of moral community.46  
                                                 
42 P. O’Malley, ‘Volatile and contradictory punishment’ (1999) 3(2) Theoretical Criminology 175 at 185-
189. 
43 S. Driver and L. Martell, ‘New Labour’s communitarianisms’ (1997) 17(3) Critical Social Policy 27.  
44 P. Squires, ‘New Labour and the politics of anti-social behaviour’ (2006) 26(1) Critical Social Policy 
144 at 147. 
45 A. Haworth and T. Manzi, ‘Managing the underclass: interpreting the moral discourse of housing 
management’ (1999) 36(1) Urban Studies 153. 
46 Rose, op. cit. n. 6, p. 337. 
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The ‘anti-social’ youth subject is assumed to be quite capable of responsible freedom, 
but has selfishly refused to exercise it. The neo-conservative criminology of the other 
frames anti-social behaviour in terms of disrespect and irresponsibility, rather than a 
natural part of growing up, or a symptom of blameless pathology.  
Neo-conservative reconstruction of the ‘anti-social’ youth has had important 
consequences for the rationalities and technologies deployed in their governance. As we 
have seen, the welfarist criminology of the other places a considerable degree of faith in 
the ability of social work to normalize anti-social youth. Conversely, the move from an 
explanation of the causes of anti-social behaviour focused in part upon pathology to one 
defined in terms of an outright refusal to exercise responsible freedom leads inevitably 
to the conclusion that the disciplinary role of social work is governmentally irrelevant. 
The source of appropriate governance of anti-social behaviour rests not with 
professional intervention but, instead, with the ‘anti-social’ youth him or herself. 
Moreover, the most appropriate way in which to govern the subject is assumed to be the 
residual technologies of what Mitchell Dean terms ‘authoritarian governmentality’. 
Dean recognises that, while the advanced liberal state has increasingly sought to 
govern through subtle forms of disciplinary and ethopolitical technique, direct sovereign 
rule continues for ‘certain populations held to be without the attributes of responsible 
freedom.’47 He explores the ways in which crime control continues to rely upon 
‘despotic’ forms of government where the subject has failed to engage in effective 
processes of ethical self-governance. He describes this as ‘authoritarian 
governmentality, [or] … non-liberal and explicitly authoritarian types of rule that seek 
to operate through obedient rather than free subjects, or, at a minimum, endeavour to 
neutralize opposition to authority.’48 Neo-conservative discourse presumes that, rather 
than independently exercising appropriate self-governance, or requiring the disciplinary 
intervention of social work, the ASBO subject has actively rejected the demand to 
exercise his inherent capacity for responsible freedom. Given this combination of 
capacity, and unwillingness, to respond to ethopolitical exhortation, governance must be 
instilled instead through the direct sovereign prohibition of the order’s criminal 
sanction.49 
The neo-conservative rejection of the rationalities of welfarist criminologies of 
everyday life and the other is reinforced further by concomitant challenges to the 
                                                 
47 M. Dean, op. cit. n. 14, p. 131. 
48 Id. 
49 Part of a new era of ‘contractual governance’: see A. Crawford, ‘“Contractual governance” of deviant 
behaviour’ (2003) 30(4) JLS 479. 
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traditional altruistic justifications for welfarism. Neo-conservatism encourages an 
exclusionary rather than inclusionary approach towards the ‘anti-social’ youth subject. 
Because anti-social behaviour by young people is treated as evidence of a rejection of 
the moral norms of society, rather than part of growing up or pathology, society is 
absolved of its welfarist moral obligations towards those individuals. As Rose writes, 
within neo-conservative discourse, 
[t]hose who refuse to become responsible, to govern themselves ethically, have 
also refused the offer to become members of our moral community. Hence, for 
them, harsh measures are entirely appropriate. Three strikes and you are out: 
citizenship becomes conditional upon conduct.50  
Thus, the successful contemporary reconstruction of the ASBO subject as a symbol of a 
depraved and dangerous youth underclass51 provides moral justification for the punitive 
and exclusionary potential of the order.52  
Similarly, neo-conservatism has had a fundamental impact upon the right to 
anonymity for the ASBO subject. Once again, the construction of the ASBO subject as 
a morally degenerate other deals a blow to altruistic arguments for their protection from 
the stigma associated with publicity by fostering a sense of justified indignation at their 
apparent irresponsibility and disrespect. The shame that might ensue from publicity of 
anti-social behaviour is treated increasingly as a legitimate penalty for the ASBO 
subject, in much the same way as an adult offender. Indeed, the right of the ASBO 
subject to anonymity is viewed as a startling illustration of the degree to which the 
welfarist state had become ‘soft’ on youth crime. Moreover, neo-conservatism poses an 
apparently coherent challenge to the governmental objectives behind the right to 
anonymity. The Government’s disconcerting silence on the issue of labelling should be 
treated as an implicit neo-conservative rejection of this welfarist ethopolitical strategy.  
It is, of course, fairly unsurprising that New Labour would be reluctant to 
entertain an ethopolitics of labelling. As we have seen, the theory advocates that formal 
criminal justice measures should be avoided whenever possible in the governance of 
‘anti-social’ youth. Conversely, neo-conservatism dictates that it is not the intervention 
of the criminal justice system into the lives of ‘anti-social’ youth, but its historic failure 
                                                 
50 Rose, op. cit. n. 2, p. 267. 
51 H. Davis and M. Bourhill, ‘“Crisis”: the demonization of children and young people’ in Scraton, op. cit. 
n. 28. 
52 The neo-conservative claim that the authoritarian governance of the ASBO is an effective way to 
maintain control over populations is of course contentious. Recent empirical research reveals that the 
ASBO breach rate has risen to over 50 per cent: National Audit Office, Tackling Anti-social Behaviour, 
HC 99 Session 2006-2007 (2006), p. 19; Policy Research Bureau and NACRO, Anti-social Behaviour 
Orders (2006). 
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to intervene, that has led to an apparently pervasive youth culture of disrespect and 
irresponsibility.  Consequently, the Respect agenda has brought low level disorder by 
young people within the net of the criminal justice system, responding to it instead 
through the authoritarian governmentality of formal, sovereign processes of 
enforcement such as the ASBO. 
More importantly, neo-conservatism also challenges the knowledge claims of 
labelling theory. I have argued that the ethopolitics of labelling depends for its power as 
a rationality upon a particular, welfarist construction of ‘anti-social’ youth. It assumes 
that the youth ASBO subject is both capable of and willing to exercise responsible 
freedom, achievable either independently or, where the conduct is deemed pathological, 
with the support of the disciplinary processes of social work. The ultimate concern of an 
ethopolitics of labelling is that a young person’s inevitable progress to responsible 
freedom will be undermined by the countervailing processes of community stigma 
arising from publicity, encouraging the ‘anti-social’ subject to actively reject those 
moral norms. Yet labelling theory fails under a neo-conservative reconstruction of the 
ASBO subject. Rather than progressing steadily towards appropriate ethical self-
governance, the neo-conservative youth subject is assumed to have already rejected 
outright society’s moral demands. Thus, he is positioned, not as a subject at risk of 
descent from circuits of inclusion to circuits of exclusion,53 but one operating firmly 
within those latter circuits from the outset. Accordingly, stripped of its original 
preventative welfarist rationale, the governmental possibilities of anonymity can be 
increasingly ignored.   
 
3. THE RISE OF YOUTH PUBLICITY AS AN ETHOPOLITICAL TECHNOLOGY 
 
Thus far, I have argued that the perceived value of anonymity, as an ancillary 
mechanism designed to protect young offenders from the impact of community stigma 
for both altruistic and governmental reasons, has been undermined by neo-conservative 
representations of the ASBO subject. It is the further contention of this section that the 
(at least partial) movement from welfarism to advanced liberal forms of rule within 
youth justice policy has ensured not only the fall of anonymity, but the simultaneous 
rise of publicity in the governance of the ASBO subject. In 2006, the Home Office 
released guidance to practitioners on ASBO publicity, setting out a number of 
justifications for its use: enforcement of the order; public reassurance about safety; 
                                                 
53 Rose, op. cit., n. 6. 
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public confidence in local services; deterrence to perpetrators and deterrence to others.54 
These justifications provide the basis for the following analysis, which highlights how 
publicity of the ASBO subject as a governmental technology confirms much of the 
recent work of the governmentality school on the current state of advanced liberal crime 
control policies. In particular, the justifications reflect the Labour government’s broader 
neo-liberal efforts to harness the governmental potential of ‘responsibilized 
communities’.55  
Numerous commentators have explored the implication of communities in 
advanced liberal governmental strategies.56 Indeed, notwithstanding the inherent 
ambiguity of the term, New Labour’s focus upon the community colours its own brand 
of neo-conservative politics; communitarianism, providing an apparent compromise 
between the rampant individualism of Thatcherism and the wholesale public provision 
of the social. In particular, the governmentality school note the expectations 
increasingly placed upon the community in terms of its crime control responsibilities.57 
Flint contends that the ethopolitics of responsibilized community are based upon two 
broad assumptions: 
First, that neighbourhood or community processes themselves impact on levels of 
disorder, and second, that there is a need to re-establish norms of behaviour and 
values held in common between citizens. Community therefore becomes both a 
territory and a means of governing crime and disorder.58  
As the following sections explain, there are two ways in which publicity operates to 
harness the governmental potential of responsibilized community. An ethopolitical 
strategy exists to improve communities by engaging them in surveillance of the ASBO, 
while communities are also implicated in the ASBO subject’s own self-governance as 
part of a developing ethopolitics of shame. 
 
(a) Governing through community: the ethopolitics of surveillance 
 
                                                 
54 Home Office, op. cit. n. 34, p. 2. 
55 J. Flint, ‘Housing and ethopolitics: constructing identities of active consumption and responsible 
community’ (2003) 32(4) Economy and Society 611. 
56 Rose, op. cit. n. 5, pp. 331-7. Outside the governmentality school, see A. Crawford, The Local 
Governance of Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnership (1997). 
57 J. Flint, ‘Return of the governors: citizenship and the new governance of neighbourhood disorder in the 
UK’ (2002) 6(3) Citizenship Studies 245; P. O’Malley and D. Palmer, ‘Post-Keynesian policing’ (1996) 
25(2) Economy and Society 137; K. Stenson ‘Community policing as a governmental technology’ (1993) 
22(3) Economy and Society 373. 
58 Flint, id., p. 249. 
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Historically, crime control in the United Kingdom has been the exclusive task of the 
formal agents of the criminal justice system; one of the consequences of the social 
model of collective security adopted during the 19th and 20th century.59 Increasingly, 
however, under advanced liberal rule, neo-liberal pressures have encouraged the 
responsibilization of the individuals and organizations of the private sphere as agents of 
law enforcement. This is no more evident than community policing strategies, including 
most recently the governance of ‘anti-social behaviour’. Indeed, the ASBO is itself a 
clear example of the responsibilization of agencies beyond the formal criminal justice 
system: it was designed not only for the use of police authorities, but also local 
authorities and social landlords.60 Following the enactment of the Serious Organized 
Crime and Police Act 2005, the Government is now also able to add to the list of 
relevant agencies by statutory instrument,61 and empower local authorities to contract 
out their ASBO functions to specified private organisations.62 
As O’Malley and Palmer note, ‘one set of aims and effects of community policing 
may be to co-opt the population in processes of routine surveillance, and to increase the 
flow of information coming to the police’.63 This surveillance aspect of community 
responsibilization is particularly evident around the ASBO. Its efficacy as a sovereign 
form of rule clearly depends upon enforcement of its terms, necessitating intensive 
oversight of the young person subject to the order. However, orders often cover wide 
geographical areas and a broad range of behaviour, and as such the police and local 
authorities are unlikely to have the resources required to patrol each and every possible 
breach. It is unsurprising, then, that the community has been recognised by the 
Government as key to the policing of the ASBO, allowing continuous, informal 
surveillance of the order.64 Most telling, perhaps, is Campbell’s conclusion, based upon 
empirical research on the operation of the order, that local agencies themselves view 
                                                 
59 Rose, op. cit. n. 5, p. 335. 
60 CDA 1998, s. 1. 
61 CDA 1998, s. 1A. The list was recently extended in this way to include the Environment Agency and 
Transport for London: Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Relevant Authorities and Relevant Persons) Order 
2006. 
62 CDA 1998, s. 1F. The Government has recently proposed to allow local authorities to contract out these 
responsibilities to private organizations that manage their social housing: Draft Local Authorities 
(Contracting out of Anti-social Behaviour Order Functions) (England) Order 2007. It also plans to extend 
these powers to include Tenant Management Organisations (TMOs), private tenant-led institutions 
granted powers to part-manage social housing: Department of Communities and Local Government, 
‘Press release: new powers for tenants to tackle anti-social behaviour – Kelly’, 9 January 2007, p. 2. 
63 O’Malley and Palmer, op. cit. n. 57, p. 137. A contemporary example is the increasingly complex 
relations between private, municipal and public forms of visible policing: A. Crawford, S. Lister, S. 
Blackburn and J. Burnett, Plural Policing: The Mixed Economy of Visible Patrols in England and Wales 
(2005). 
64 Home Office, op. cit. n.  34, p. 2. 
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publicity as important ‘because it [spreads] the responsibility of enforcement around the 
community’,65 capturing perfectly the neo-liberal rationalities behind the appeal to 
communities in this context.  
On one analysis, then, the extension of responsibility for surveillance of the 
ASBO to communities is a straightforward example of neo-liberal responsibilization, 
with ‘members of the public being constituted as competent and skilled agents’ of crime 
control.66 It appears, however, that the governmental mentalities behind this particular 
process of responsibilization are broader than this. As Flint notes, community is viewed 
simultaneously as both a ready source of governmental power and a target for 
ethopolitical strategies. Indeed, behind the responsibilization strategy once can identify 
a desire not only to better govern the ASBO subject, but additionally to better govern 
the community itself. The Home Office guidance states that  
ASBOs are community-based orders that involve local people not only in the 
collection of evidence but also in helping to enforce breaches. By their nature 
they encourage local communities to become actively involved in reporting crime 
and disorder and contributing actively to building and protecting the 
community.67  
Here, the Government confirms explicitly that the surveillance role of the community is 
part of a more general ethopolitical strategy to create an ‘active citizenry’ willing and 
capable of civic engagement; part of its commitment to what it terms civil renewal.68  
In 2004, Alvaro Gil-Robles, the previous Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe, assessed the human rights implications of the ASBO. Recognising 
that responsibility for the surveillance of the ASBO had been passed to communities, he 
states: ‘I cannot help but be somewhat uneasy over [the] transfer of policing duties to 
local residents’.69 He makes no further attempt to elaborate upon his concerns. I would 
make two observations, however, about the possible negative repercussions of 
responsibilization of communities in this context. On the one hand, given that the need 
for effective enforcement of the ASBO through publicity involves a direct trade-off with 
the right to anonymity, Gil-Robles’ fears may spring partly from a welfarist 
construction of the ASBO subject as vulnerable and a concomitant belief in youth 
anonymity as an altruistic and governmental necessity. On the other, a further criticism 
might be levelled at the Government’s specific adoption of surveillance as an 
                                                 
65 S. Campbell, A Review of Anti-social Behaviour Orders (2002), p. 102. 
66 O’Malley and Palmer, op. cit. n. 57, p. 137. 
67 Home Office, op. cit. n. 34, p. 9. 
68 Civil Renewal Unit, Together We Can: The Government Action Plan for Civil Renewal (2005). 
69 Gil-Robles, op. cit. n. 37, para. 119. 
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ethopolitical technique to foster active citizenship within communities. Prior has 
recently challenged the apparently inevitable benefits of active citizenry and civil 
renewal. As he forewarns: 
There may be inherent flaws in this conceptualisation of a virtuous spiral 
involving the agendas of civil renewal and community safety, because the latter is 
as likely to generate relationships based on suspicion as it is those based on trust. 
… [C]ertain forms of community safety initiative are likely to reproduce and 
possibly exacerbate inherent dynamics of social exclusion that exist within 
communities.70 
Arguably, the Government’s ethopolitics of surveillance, encouraged by publicity of the 
ASBO subject, pits the community against the ASBO subject in a relationship of mutual 
suspicion. As such, it has the potential to promote an active citizenry of a firmly neo-
conservative, exclusionary bent. 
 
(b) Governing through community: the ethopolitics of shame 
 
Rose describes ethopolitical strategies as operating ‘through the self-steering forces of 
honour and shame, or propriety, obligation, trust, fidelity, and commitment to others’.71 
Harnessing these internal processes is central to advanced liberal efforts to govern, from 
a distance, by encouraging a subject’s own powers of ethical self-improvement. The 
governmental efficacy of shame, like each of these ethopolitical processes, requires 
subjects to be bound by what Vaughan terms an ‘emotional attachment’ to ‘appropriate 
“webs of belonging’’’.72 Increasingly, it is one’s community that has been identified as 
the territory within which those webs can be found, and, accordingly, where an 
ethopolitics of shame must necessarily take place. Indeed, in line with these 
developments, the following section explores how the granting of an ASBO is expected 
to encourage the ASBO subject, through shame, to work on themselves and align 
themselves again with the norms of the community. Publicity, in this context, is 
intended to intensify the ethopolitical power of shame through the widest possible 
transmission of the ASBO subject’s details and offending conduct.  
Shame as a governmental technique appears to be a fairly uncontroversial 
ethopolitical objective in relation to adult offenders. For instance, Spencer implicitly 
                                                 
70 D. Prior, ‘Civil renewal and community safety: virtuous policy spiral or dynamic of exclusion?’ (2005) 
4(4) Social Policy & Society 357 at 364. 
71 Rose, op. cit. n. 6, p. 324. 
72 Vaughan, op. cit. n. 7, p. 348. 
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identifies this aspect of publicity of criminal proceedings when he writes that for adults 
it appears well-established that ‘the risk of public shame [through media publicity] is 
part of the law’s system of deterrents’.73 Welfarism within youth justice, however, has 
tended to highlight the inappropriateness, both altruistic and governmental, of 
governance through shame, particularly in light of the implications of publicity for the 
labelling of the young offender. It is contended, however, that in an advanced liberal 
era, in which the role of welfare within youth justice policy has been increasingly 
undermined, shame is now viewed within certain political discourse as an appropriate 
technique for the governance not only of adults but children too. Indeed, the evidence 
suggests that shame is a technology employed increasingly by local agencies as part of 
their ASBO strategies. For example, Medway Council recently admitted before the 
High Court that it had deliberately employed publicity in order to shame a 13-year-old 
ASBO subject.74 Notable too is Guildford council’s ‘wall of shame’ on which images of 
ASBO recipients are projected.75  
It is perhaps surprising, then, that in its guidance on the use of publicity the 
Government has explicitly refused to acknowledge the role of shame as a governmental 
technique: ‘[p]ublicity is not intended to punish, shame or embarrass the individual’.76 
The Government’s recalcitrance in advocating an ethopolitics of shame appears strange, 
given its own neo-conservative construction of the ASBO subject as other, and the 
concomitant punitive discourses that underpin other aspects of its anti-social behaviour 
policies. Indeed, I believe that in reality the valorisation of shame fits the Government’s 
own communitarian sensibilities. However, I would suggest that its apparent rejection 
of this governmental technique could simply reflect a pragmatic concern that explicit 
advocacy of the shaming of the ASBO subject would simply be too Draconian for many 
members of the electorate to accept, persuading it to emphasise the more rational 
objective of effective public surveillance of the order instead. If so, the decision 
illustrates the continued possibility of a role for welfarist resistance in policy formation; 
an issue returned to in the final part of this paper. It also highlights the limits of the 
predominantly textual approach of this paper, perhaps leaving hidden much of the true 
nature of the rationalities and technologies operating around the ASBO subject.  
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the Government’s own rhetoric, the law, as the 
authorizer of governmental techniques, has taken a different approach to the regulation 
                                                 
73 Spencer, op. cit., n. 29, p. 466. 
74 Medway Council v BBC [2002] 1 FLR 104, para. 6. 
75 Squires with Stephen, op. cit. n. 9, p. 523. 
76 Home Office, op. cit. n. 34, p. 2. 
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of the right to anonymity under the 1933 Act. In the leading case of T v St Albans 
Crown Court,77 the High Court considered the factors that a judge could appropriately 
take into account when deciding whether a section 39 order, guaranteeing the 
anonymity of the ASBO subject, should be granted. In so doing, Elias J commended the 
earlier pronouncement of Simon Brown LJ that:  
The prospect of being named in court with the accompanying disgrace is a 
powerful deterrent and the naming of defendant in the context of his punishment 
serves as a deterrent to others. These deterrents are proper objectives for the court 
to seek.78 
Following this precedent, he concluded that ‘as far as shaming may, and often will, have 
a legitimate deterrent effect, it is a relevant factor to weigh against its potential adverse 
effect.’79 Shame, then, has been authorised by law as a technology of rule, 
notwithstanding both the Government’s refusal to countenance its use, broader welfarist 
concerns with its exclusionary effects, and its questionable effectiveness as a 
governmental technique.  
These judicial developments provide an important insight into the role that law 
plays, independently of politics, in the formation of mentalities of governance. Simon 
Brown LJ’s assumption about the value of shame – its position as a ‘powerful tool’ - 
illustrates the law’s position as a particularly dominant source of expertise in the 
construction of ‘truths’ about the appropriate subjectification of the target of 
governance. Moreover, it highlights how, through the process of legal precedence, this 
knowledge can transfer to the governance of new subjects (in this case, the target of an 
ASBO) without the need for reconsideration of its relevance in the new context. Indeed, 
what is interesting is the absence of even the most basic evidence to support Simon 
Brown LJ’s claim. Consequently, the law has been able to authorize an absolute 
rejection of the ethopolitics of labelling in favour of the neo-conservative ‘common-
sense’ of shame, notwithstanding that it is, in reality, of debatable value according to 
other expert discourses. 
Before proceeding, I want to note finally an interesting implication of the move 
towards community-based governance of the ASBO subject for our genealogy of youth 
anonymity. As contended from the outset, the rise of anonymity as a governmental 
technology was, in part, an attempt by the welfare liberal state to restrict the operation 
of community-based processes as they relate to the young offender, as it was perceived 
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that these processes, in the form of community stigma, would undermine their progress 
to responsible freedom, by classifying them as deviant. Yet now, as a consequence of 
the neo-liberal rationalities underpinning advanced liberalism, community (rather than 
the state) has been elevated to a prominent role in the governance of the ASBO subject. 
Rather than attempting to remove the ASBO subject from the disciplinary circuits of 
communities, the latter has become now an integral component of his or her control. 
The welfarist ethopolitics of labelling, fearful of the governmental processes of 
community, have been superseded by the advanced liberal ethopolitics of shame, with 
those processes at its core. 
Yet once again, notwithstanding the growing acceptance of an ethopolitics of 
shame, its value as a technique for the governance of the ASBO subject is contentious. 
One concern is that communities may well not be able to impose the necessary ‘webs of 
belonging’ within which the behaviour of the ASBO subject can be contained. There is 
a tendency under neo-liberalism to construct communities idealistically as inherently 
capable of effective self-regulation, if only they were allowed do to so by an 
overbearing state. John Flint, however, argues convincingly that all too often the 
necessary social capital required to do so is unavailable in the deprived communities 
most in need of the power of governance over its members.80 Either the required social 
cohesion no longer exists within a community, or it exists but an absence of collective 
efficacy prevents it from being deployed. Indeed, Flint contends that it was the fact that 
the appeal to responsibilized communities proved so unsuccessful in the areas suffering 
from the most debilitating forms of anti-social behaviour that forced the Government to 
resort to direct intervention through, inter alia, the ASBO.  
The ethopolitics of shame may also prove ineffectual because many ASBO 
subjects are governed not by the disapproving community, but by competing 
governmental forces operating at the local level. As noted earlier, Stenson recognises, as 
part of his focus upon the continued relevance of sovereign rule under advanced 
liberalism, that the governors of nation states have found their sovereignty increasingly 
challenged by competing forces, both supra- and sub-national. He explains that, at the 
sub-national level, 
ethnic, religious, criminal and other sites of governance in civil society do more 
than resist state power. They have their own agendas of governance, forms of 
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knowledge and expertise deployed to govern and maintain solidarity in and over 
their own territories and populations.81 
Accordingly, sovereign forms of governance are often employed to reinstate control 
over particular political and geographical spaces.82 Returning to the specific ethopolitics 
of shame, it might be argued that in certain circumstances the ASBO subject will be 
governed more successfully by the competing forces of what Stenson refers to as ‘youth 
self-organization’,83 or governance by his or her peer group. 
Indeed, evidence suggests that the ASBO subject could in fact be tied into the 
competing web of his or her peer group much more firmly than that of the disapproving 
community. Resistance to the ethopolitics of shame as a consequence of the ASBO 
subject’s position within processes of youth self-organization may help to explain the 
conclusion of recent research into attitudes towards ASBOs among young people 
carried out by NACRO and the Policy Research Bureau that both the imposition and 
publicising of an ASBO acts as a badge of honour, rather than shame, for certain 
individuals.84  
That is not to say that shame is an inherently ineffective governmental technique. 
John Braithwaite, in his seminal research on governance through shame, argued 
convincingly that shame can have positive consequences for social control.85 However, 
at the heart of Braithwaite’s thesis was, of course, the fundamental distinction drawn 
between disintegrative and reintegrative forms of shaming. Only the latter approach, in 
which concerted efforts are made to integrate the subject back within appropriate ‘webs 
of belonging’, will succeed in harnessing the ethopolitical value of this powerful 
emotion. In the absence of reintegrative modes of shaming, as Schur once pointed out, 
the exclusionary impact of labelling through publicity may simply reinforce the ASBO 
subject’s sense of association with other anti-social youth and consequently exacerbate 
that conduct.86 Indeed, given the demonisation evident in increasingly sensationalist 
reporting of the ASBO subject, discussed below, the neo-conservative faith in publicity 
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as a way to promote an ethopolitics of shame may, on a welfarist analysis, prove 
dangerously counter-productive. 
 
4. THE RISE OF YOUTH PUBLICITY AS A SOVEREIGN TECHNOLOGY 
 
Stenson’s reconsideration of sovereign rule reveals how governance is directed not only 
towards the effective management of individuals and populations, but the control of 
territory itself.87 The state has grown increasingly worried about its own governmental 
limitations, particularly in the face of the pressures of globalisation, transfer of powers 
to supernational organisations such as the EU and competing claims by communal 
groups seeking to govern certain populations from below, such as the forces of ‘youth 
self-organization’ discussed above. As David Garland recognises, one important way in 
which the state has sought to regain sovereign control over its political and geographical 
territory (in terms of electoral success) has been the use of authoritarian crime control to 
confirm its own authority; flexing its muscles to ‘give the impression that something is 
being done – here now, swiftly and decisively’.88 Thus, under advanced liberal rule, the 
sovereign governance of crime is both instrumental and expressive. 
Expressive forms of sovereign rule are clearly evident behind the politics of anti-
social behaviour.89 As Squires notes, ‘the Law and Order issue’, of which the Respect 
agenda is central, has ‘undoubtedly been the making of New Labour’.90 Crawford adds 
that,  
[t]he current governmental preoccupation with petty crime, disorder and ASB 
reflects a sense of ‘anxiety’ about which something can be done in an otherwise 
uncertain world.91   
Importantly, because the concept of anti-social behaviour is politically constructed, it 
provides the Government with an opportunity to take control of the issue and define 
both the problem and its solution, with the Respect agenda, 
in part at least, an attempt by government to engage directly in a politics of 
representation about law, order and public safety, an attempt to influence public 
perceptions directly.92  
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The representation that the Government has sought to put forward is an image of a 
strong state apparatus, capable of effectively tackling the problem of anti-social 
behaviour, in order to reduce the fear of crime and, accordingly, reinforce its sovereign 
state by securing the political faith of the electorate.  
Hughes and Follett argue that the ASBO is itself an illustration of expressive, as 
well as instrumental, sovereign rule.93 The mechanism has proved highly mediagenic, 
representing to the public the toughness of the Respect agenda, and indeed is viewed by 
the Government as integral to its electoral success.94 Moreover, representations of the 
ASBO are not simply valuable to national government. Local agencies too are able to 
secure their own positions through displays of sovereign strength. The empirical work 
of Thomas et al supports this conclusion, suggesting that local agencies are often more 
interested in using ASBOs to provide reassurance to the community, rather than 
believing that the order can really change behaviour.95 In many cases the external, 
expressive objective of the order takes precedence then over its internal, ethopolitical 
value. Clearly, for the Government, publicity is vital to the successful deployment of the 
ASBO as an expressive act of state sovereignty. As its guidance makes clear, publicity 
is further justified ‘as a way to restore public confidence in local services’.96 Publicity 
of the ASBO subject is viewed as a symbol of the power of local agencies to tackle not 
only anti-social behaviour, but also their competence in all forms of public provision.  
However, the pursuit of expressive forms of sovereignty poses inevitable 
governmental dangers. In its effort to shore up faith in national and local government 
through publicity, Labour has manipulated the fear and insecurity of the public. Yet, 
ultimately it may find itself unable to meet the expectations it has created. Tonry 
contends that  
by making anti-social behaviour into a major social policy problem, and giving it 
sustained high visibility attention, Labour has made a small problem larger, 
thereby making people more aware of it and less satisfied with their lives and 
their government.97  
Indeed, one might note the internal contradictions in the Government’s own 
justifications for publicity of the ASBO subject. One of the additional objectives of 
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publicity, according to the guidance, is to reassure the public about their safety.98 Yet as 
Jamieson points out, media attention to the issue may well lead to the ‘paradoxical 
outcome’ that the public’s fear of crime actually increases.99  
The problem, of course, is that the construction of the debate, at the level of 
explicit central government discourse at least, is one skewed in favour of punitive 
responses to anti-social behaviour such as the ASBO. Notwithstanding the continued 
evidence of welfarist discourses operating around the ASBO subject in practice, the 
Government is only tentatively willing ‘to associate [itself] publicly with, and to 
promote, responses to offending that are not exclusively punitive’.100 New Labour’s war 
against anti-social behaviour has actually increased the public’s fear of crime, while in 
reality crime rates continue to fall, threatening to create a ‘punishment deficit’ between 
supply and demand of punishment at both national and local level.101 Moreover, 
publicity of the ASBO subject could encourage both local and national governments to 
move even further towards authoritarian solutions to anti-social behaviour. Indeed, that 
this may cause serious problems for the continued sovereignty of both national 
government and local agencies is evident in Campbell’s warning, following her 
empirical research into the use of ASBOs, that where local agencies engage in major 
publicity of orders granted in the area, ‘[m]anaging the expectation such a campaign 
may create is potentially problematic for partnerships’.102 
 
5. MOVING TOWARDS SENSATIONALISM? 
 
This paper has contended that the deployment of publicity of the ASBO subject reflects 
the simultaneous deployment of three components of advanced liberal rule. First, 
publicity seeks to responsibilize communities as agents of crime control, and to promote 
an ethopolitics of active citizenship, by encouraging surveillance of the ASBO. Second, 
and controversially, the courts have authorized publicity of the ASBO subject as part of 
an ethopolitics of shame. Third, and finally, publicity is viewed by national and local 
government as a way to augment sovereign governance of the electorate, by reducing 
their fear of crime and consequently increasing faith in the state. In this final section I 
want to draw together these components of publicity as governmental technology – 
surveillance, sovereignty and shame - and conclude about their implications for the 
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ASBO subject. My first point, very simply, is that anonymity will be increasingly 
waived in ASBO proceedings under section 39. Neo-conservative constructions of the 
ASBO subject undermining the altruistic and governmental role of anonymity, together 
with the new justifications for publicity of the order, will inevitably impact upon 
judicial decision-making; an issue explored further in the following section. 
Additionally, however, it is likely that publicity will contain increasingly 
‘sensationalist’ representations of the ASBO subject. By sensationalism, I refer to 
publicity that reinforces the image of the ASBO subject as other through lurid 
reportage. Exploring this concept further, it is first necessary to identify two sources of 
ASBO publicity. The first source is, of course, the private media, arising from its 
traditional role in the reporting of legal proceedings. Harnessing the private media is 
particularly important for local agencies, according to the Home Office guidance, 
because their wider distribution allows publicity to reach a large number of individuals 
within a community affected by anti-social behaviour. Interestingly, from a 
governmental perspective, the guidance adds that local agencies that impose ASBOs 
should ensure that they actively engage in the governance of ASBO reportage by the 
private media. It points to the need to establish ‘working relationships’ with local media 
outlets, while emphasising the importance of close control of the material to ensure that 
the well-being of witnesses and vulnerable defendants are not jeopardised by 
unsanctioned disclosures.103 However, it is important to recognise, secondly, that ASBO 
publicity is carried out not only by the private media but ‘in-house’ by the public (or 
quasi-public) agencies who actually impose the orders, in the form of leaflets and 
website information distributed to local residents. 
I would argue that both these sources of publicity, private and public, are 
susceptible to sensationalism, but for markedly different reasons. With respect to the 
private press, sensationalism is of course an inevitable consequence of the commercial 
pressure to pursue newsworthy content that will attract readership and ensure maximum 
sales.104 Tabloid newspapers, in particular, tend to secure the attention of a prurient 
readership by constructing the ASBO subject as a depraved and dangerous other. 
Indeed, Thomas et al confirm that the press explicitly seeks to sensationalise material 
about ASBO subjects.105 More interesting, however is the impact of the increasing 
number of public agency forms of sensationalist publicity. It has been noted, for 
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example, that after seeking ASBOs on grounds of particular anti-social conduct by 
young people a number of ‘[l]ocal authorities and police have released full, often lurid 
details of such behaviour and the youngsters have sometimes been prompted to strike 
aggressive poses for photographs’.106 Public agencies are clearly not motivated by 
commercial considerations. What then is the explanation for sensationalism here?  
Once again, the motivation of public agencies for such sensationalism can be 
analysed usefully from a governmental perspective. The issue was considered recently 
by the High Court under the Human Rights Act 1998 in R (Stanley) v Metropolitan 
Police Commissioner.107 In that case 3,000 leaflets were distributed by Brent London 
Borough Council to members of the community containing details of a number of 
children subject to ASBOs. The document itself was clearly sensationalist, describing 
the individuals at one point as ‘animalistic … thugs and bully boys’.108 The defence 
argued that the use of such words breached Article 8 of the European Convention. 
Kennedy LJ, however, was ultimately happy to allow for this incursion into 
sensationalism, judging the content of the leaflet entirely proportionate to the legitimate 
aim of the prevention of crime and disorder. He drew attention to the importance of 
sensationalism in order to ensure the governmental objective of the responsibilization of 
communities as agents of surveillance, describing the language as ‘colourful, but … 
needed in order to attract the attention of the readership’.109 Thus, sensationalism has 
been authorized by law, through the Stanley judgment, as necessary to foster further an 
ethopolitics of surveillance.  
However, notwithstanding the law’s focus upon surveillance, it is contended that 
the legal authorization of sensationalism will also encourage public agencies to employ 
sensationalist reportage in pursuit of the other governmental objectives highlighted in 
this paper. First, sensationalism may be used to reinforce the deviancy of the ASBO 
subject as other, in order to shore up the community’s fear of anti-social behaviour and, 
as such, their faith in, and dependency upon, these agencies. Second, it could be 
perceived as a way to increase the efficacy of an ethopolitics of shame. The more 
demonising ASBO publicity, it might be argued, the more the subject, and others 
contemplating engaging in anti-social behaviour, will be deterred by the impact upon 
their reputations. Of course, on the other hand, proponents of welfarism will continue to 
focus upon the negative impact such sensationalist reportage will have upon the ASBO 
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subject and his or her governance. Sensationalism, they will argue, further reinforces the 
deviancy of targeted young people, exacerbating the harm caused by stigmatisation and 
labelling, while the reinforcement of the criminology of the other exacerbates spiralling 
public fear of ‘anti-social’ youth and encourages authoritarian responses by the state to 
further its own sovereignty. 
 
6. POSSIBILITIES OF WELFARIST RESISTANCE 
 
Notwithstanding these conclusions, it is important to recognise that neo-conservative 
constructions of the ASBO subject are inevitably not absolute. As the governmentality 
school makes clear, rationalities and technologies do not follow a clear developmental 
chronology, and as such are never perfectly implemented in practice. As with general 
crime control, this is certainly the case with youth justice policy. Muncie warns that any 
assessment of the youth justice system must avoid constructing its development as a 
linear progression of rationalities:  
The ‘new’ never replaces the old. In the twenty-first century discourses of 
protection, restoration, punishment, responsibility, rehabilitation, welfare, 
retribution, diversion, human rights and so on exist alongside each other in some 
perpetually uneasy and contradictory manner.110  
It is particularly important to avoid overstating the apparent punitive turn in crime 
control policies.111 Newburn notes that, in reality, New Labour’s stance on youth justice 
‘is somewhat tricky to characterize, for … one key element of the Government’s style 
was to “talk tough” while behind the scenes enabling sometimes more enlightened 
practices to be developed and promulgated’.112 Not only do many central government 
initiatives continue to reflect welfarist rationales, but the implementation of 
authoritarian measures is often resisted at the local level.113 Thus, the focus of 
discursive analysis upon the texts of central government can be criticised for failing to 
capture the empirical realities of the governance of young people resulting particularly 
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from resistance to, and reconstruction of, rationalities and technologies by those who 
implement them and those upon whom they are implemented. 
Hughes and Follett suggest that such contradictory responses are particularly 
evident in state governance of anti-social behaviour.114 Indeed, on closer examination 
the implementation of the ASBO provides support for Pavlich’s argument that advanced 
liberalism does not mark the death of the social, but merely the growth of ‘co-social’ 
forms of governance.115 Burney contends, for instance, that the early failure of local 
agencies to take up the ASBO was, in part at least, a continued preference for welfarist 
forms of intervention.116 Such evidence that exists suggests the ASBO subject remains a 
target of the disciplinary techniques of social work as a result of the continued welfarist 
approach to governance of many local agencies, particularly Youth Offending Teams 
(although recent research has concluded that the balance is still very much in favour of 
neo-conservative enforcement objectives).117 Second, welfarist discourses also continue 
to operate at the level of central government. In particular, Individual Support Orders 
(ISOs), introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003,118 mark the return of legal 
authorization for the formal repositioning of the ASBO subject within the disciplinary 
processes of social work, notwithstanding the Government’s continuing promulgation 
of neo-conservative rhetoric.119  
Developing this analysis, I would contend further that neo-conservative discourse 
cannot wholly undermine the pursuit of anonymity for ASBO subjects, given the 
evidence of resistance, on both altruistic and governmental grounds, of local agencies 
charged with their governance. Moreover, I would suggest, from a legal perspective, 
that the law authorising youth anonymity provides a space for contestation of the (neo-
conservative) criminology of the other through individual acts of welfarist resistance. 
As Rose and Valverde explain:  
[S]ubjects are constituted in a variety of ways in different legal contexts and 
forums. Each of these subjectifications has a history, each is differentially 
suffused by the norms and values of positive knowledge.  
They continue:  
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A proper examination of such practices would have to attend to the technicalities 
of legal procedure, and to the ways in which non-legal knowledges can be 
introduced into legal forums … A plurality of different forms of expertise have 
attached themselves to the institutions and procedures of the law. Disputes 
between biological, psychological, psychiatric and sociological forms of 
knowledge open a potentially inexhaustible space of disputation.120 
What this passage reveals is the extent to which the exercise of judicial discretion can 
provide an environment within which competing constructions of the particular legal 
subject, in the form of knowledge and expertise, can be reconstructed. 
Judicial decision-making under section 39 obviously provides one such forum into 
which alternative welfarist discourses could continue to permeate. Although under the 
section a presumption exists in favour of publicity, it can of course be rebutted by a 
judge in the public interest. There are two ways in which welfarist discourse, and 
particularly the ethopolitics of labelling, might be deployed to persuade a judge of the 
value of such an order. First, social workers can leverage their expertise to persuade a 
judge of the value of anonymity to the governance of a particular ASBO subject. By 
reintroducing welfarism within the courtroom neo-conservative discourses could give 
way to those positioning the ASBO subject as vulnerable to the negative ethopolitics of 
labelling and, accordingly, requiring protection from public stigma. 
Second, it might also be possible within this forum to harness alternative legal 
standards that explicitly recognise the ethopolitical relevance of labelling. While 
labelling theory might carry little weight within the soft law of domestic governmental 
policy documents, internationally, the 1985 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice (the ‘Beijing Rules’) explicitly justifies the Article 8 
right to privacy for juveniles in those ethopolitical terms. Article 8 reads in full: ‘The 
juvenile’s right to privacy shall be respected at all stages in order to avoid harm being 
caused to her or him by undue publicity or by the process of labelling. In principle, no 
information that may lead to the identification of a juvenile offender shall be published. 
The official commentary to the Article reads as follows: ‘Rule 8 stresses the importance 
of the protection of the juvenile's right to privacy. Young persons are particularly 
susceptible to stigmatization. Criminological research into labelling processes has 
provided evidence of the detrimental effects (of different kinds) resulting from the 
permanent identification of young persons as ‘delinquent’ or ‘criminal’ (my italics).  
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  Thus, within the governable space of the court room, opportunities still exist to 
reconstruct the ASBO subject in law through, for instance, the discourses of expert 
evidence or the competing power of international legal standards, both of which 
continue to promote an ethopolitics of labelling. Yet, while perhaps unduly pessimistic, 
I would contend finally that successful resistance at the level of the local is, in fact, 
unlikely. Without a fundamental change to the knowledge-power surrounding the 
ASBO subject, the rise of publicity as a governmental technique, particularly as part of 
an ethopolitics of surveillance and shame, will continue to place overbearing pressure 
upon courts to refuse to grant a section 39 anonymity order to an ASBO subject. 
Evidence suggests as much. According to the empirical research of Thomas et al, the 
Government’s call for increased publicity of the ASBO, together with its recent legal 
reforms, mean that coverage of successful applications and enforcement of breaches are 
now indeed proving the norm.121 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article positioned the problematization of youth anonymity in ASBO proceedings 
against a backdrop of the apparent move from a welfarist to an advanced liberal youth 
justice policy in England and Wales. In doing so, it contended through a genealogy of 
the principle that the assault upon anonymity is the result of two distinct processes: the 
fall of anonymity, and the rise of publicity, as governmental technologies. I argued, on 
the one hand, that the rejection of anonymity as an ethopolitical technique reflects the 
implicit dismissal of labelling theory within neo-conservative discourse. In its place, 
one finds a new belief in the value of publicity as part of the neo-liberal 
responsibilization of communities as agents of crime control through surveillance; part 
of a broader commitment to the ethopolitical strategy of the fostering of active 
citizenship, together with the shoring up of the sovereignty of national and local 
government. Moreover, within the courts at least, shame has been authorised as a 
valuable ethopolitical tool for the governance of the ASBO subject. I suggested, finally, 
that these objectives of surveillance, sovereignty and shame are each reinforced by 
increasingly sensationalist reportage, providing a possible explanation for this 
development among public agencies in particular. 
It is a characteristic of Foucault’s work that he avoids drawing normative 
conclusions about the value of particular forms of power, ‘concentrating, instead, upon 
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the actual way in which power operates’.122 It is an approach often criticised for 
precluding effective critique of advanced liberal forms of rule.123 Throughout this paper, 
conversely, I have highlighted a number of possible welfarist concerns with the growth 
in the publicity of the ASBO subject.  
Inevitably, governance through the publicity of ASBOs will further increase the 
stigmatisation of young people that the right to anonymity sought to avoid. The claim 
under neo-conservative reconstructions of the ASBO subject is that he or she is 
susceptible to the positive ethopolitics of shame, rather than the negative ethopolitics of 
labelling. As I have shown, however, the claimed potency of shame as a governmental 
technique does not seem to be borne out by the available empirical evidence, which 
suggests conversely that the ASBO subject are often not tied within the necessary webs 
of belonging to the disapproving elements of the community, but instead may be subject 
to the more powerful control of competing knowledge, in the form of youth self-
organization, that promotes the ASBO as a badge of honour. One must also consider the 
possibility that labelling could ultimately undermine the effective governance of ASBO 
subjects. Indeed, deploying Braithwaite’s empirical work in this area, disregarded by 
the common sense of neo-conservatism, disintegrative shaming of this kind has 
dangerous implications for social exclusion. 
The ethopolitics of surveillance poses further problems. For instance, it has not 
been shown that policing is aided by the publicity of the ASBO subject; it is unclear 
how much, and how well, the community actually engages in effective surveillance of 
the order. It seems a little premature, then, for the Government to assume the need for 
publicity, at the expense of long-standing protections of anonymity, without question. I 
am also concerned that the use of surveillance as a form of ethopolitics may lead to the 
encouragement of a distorted form of active citizenry that reinforces the contemporary 
neo-conservative, exclusionary, conception of ‘anti-social’ youth. Furthermore, the 
pursuit of expressive forms of sovereign rule, in an effort to exert control over political 
territory, may ultimately cause both central and local government to lose control over 
the ‘anti-social behaviour’ problem. Indeed, with sensationalism reinforcing the 
demonisation of young people, both individually and collectively, as other, inclusionary 
technologies may prove increasingly unpalatable to a public reliant upon media 
representations of anti-social behaviour.  
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Finally, I have explored the particular part played by law and legal systems in 
‘authorising’ governance through publicity. As I have contended, the structure of 
section 39 provides an important opportunity for law’s fielding of the various 
alternative discourses – classical, welfarist and advanced liberal – that currently operate 
around the right to anonymity of the ASBO subject. In particular, it is the structure of 
this section that provides an opportunity for particular welfarist discourses (of the expert 
evidence of social workers and the standards of international law) to reinvigorate both 
altruistic and governmental discourses that favour anonymity where they are deemed 
appropriate. My concern, however, is that pervasive neo-conservative constructions of 
the ASBO subject as other, together with the importance placed by the judiciary upon 
the value of the ethopolitics of surveillance and shame, will nevertheless lead to a 
drastic decrease in the granting of section 39 orders. Governance through anonymity 
looks likely to prove a further welfarist casualty of advanced liberal rule. 
 
*** 
